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Abstract 
In this article, we review the literature on the measurement of trade costs in international 
trade with a special emphasis on nontariff measures and in particular on standards and 
technical regulations. We distinguish ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ approaches. The direct approach 
collects observable data or proxy variables on trade cost components which are then typically 
used as regressors in a gravity equation of trade. Instead, the indirect approach infers the 
extent of trade impediments from trade flows. It compares actual trade flows to the trade 
flows predicted by a hypothetical frictionless benchmark scenario based on a micro-founded 
trade model, attributing the deviation of actual from predicted trade flows to trade frictions. 
We argue that economists and policymakers can gain useful insights from both approaches.  
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1 Introduction
Despite the long tradition in the international economics profession of investigating the sources and
size of trade costs, empirical researchers continue to face a major challenge in measuring trade costs
since ‘direct measures are remarkably sparse and inaccurate’ (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004,
p. 692). Direct measures are available for a few components such as transportation and insurance
costs, policy barriers such as tari¤ or nontari¤ measures, but not for many other components such
as bureaucratic red tape. In addition, data coverage is often limited to a few countries, industries,
products or years (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).
To overcome those di¢culties, an alternative approach to measuring trade costs is to indirectly
infer the level of trade impediments from trade ‡ows. A …rst way of doing this is to use the ‘phi-ness’
of trade to estimate ‘border e¤ects,’ which is in essence a ratio of bilateral over domestic trade ‡ows
and mostly re‡ects border-related costs (Head and Ries, 2001, Baldwin et al., 2003, Head and Mayer,
2004). A second and related approach is to rely on a measure of bilateral trade impediments that is
derived by modeling disaggregated trade ‡ows at the industry level in the gravity framework pioneered
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004), allowing trade costs to be heterogeneous across industries.
The resulting measure accounts for heterogeneity across industries by incorporating industry-speci…c
substitution elasticities (Chen and Novy, 2011).
This paper reviews the literature on the measurement of trade costs with a special emphasis on
nontari¤ measures such as product standards and technical regulations which require speci…c product
characteristics or production methods in order to guarantee the health and safety of consumers or the
protection of the environment.1 Di¤ering standards and technical regulations (or Technical Barriers
to Trade, TBTs) can indeed be obstacles to trade as they can create additional costs for foreign
producers by forcing them to adjust their products to meet national requirements. In order to overcome
their trade-distorting e¤ects, policymakers try to harmonize such standards and regulations between
countries.2 A contrasting view considers that standards and regulations may instead encourage trade
by raising quality or by promoting scale economies (see Blind, 2004, Swann et al., 1996). Our main
aim, however, is to review how standards and regulations are measured for the purpose of empirical
analysis, not how they a¤ect international trade (Swann, 2010).
Compared to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), who provide an extensive review of the mea-
surement of any type of trade costs, the objective of this paper is to extend their review to articles
mostly published after their seminal contribution with a special emphasis on standards and technical
regulations. We also distinguish between the ‘direct’ and the ‘indirect’ approaches to measuring non-
1Technical regulations are imposed by governments so that their compliance is mandatory, while for standards com-
pliance is only voluntary : …rms decide to comply with standards, otherwise their products may simply not be demanded
by …rms or consumers (Baller, 2007).
2 In the EU policymakers rely on mutual recognition or on technical harmonization. With mutual recognition, each
country is obliged to accept on its territory the products lawfully marketed in another member state even if foreign
products are manufactured according to technical rules that di¤er from domestic ones (Brenton et al., 2001). When this
is not possible, mutual recognition is replaced by technical harmonization (since 1985 the ‘New Approach’ to technical
harmonization has only de…ned the essential safety requirements of a product, leaving the producer free to design the
rest). Both mutual recognition and harmonization are thus expected to promote trade within the harmonizing region
(Baller, 2007, Brenton et al., 2001, Chen and Mattoo, 2008).
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tari¤ measures and illustrate their similarities and di¤erences using some data on private standards
at the European Union (EU) level.
2 The Gravity Equation as a Starting Point
Traditionally, researchers attempt to learn about the e¤ect of trade costs on trade by considering the
gravity equation, which has been shown to have broad theoretical foundations (Anderson, 2011). As
an illustration, we adopt the popular speci…cation by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) based on an
Armington model:
 =
 



Ã

¦ 


!1¡
 (1)
where bilateral trade ‡ows  in industry  depend on output 

 of the exporting country  in
industry  and expenditure  of the importing country  relative to global output 
 in that industry.
The interest focuses on bilateral trade costs . They reduce trade as governed by the elasticity of
substitution   1 amongst the underlying product varieties in that industry. All else being equal,
larger average outward trade barriers ¦ of country  and larger average inward trade barriers 

 of
country  lead to more bilateral trade.3 For estimation purposes, gravity equation (1) is typically log-
linearized, and the output and multilateral resistance terms are absorbed by exporter and importer
…xed e¤ects, or they are approximated using Baier and Bergstrand’s (2009) method.
A researcher who wants to estimate the e¤ect of trade costs on trade needs to specify a trade
cost function by relating the unobservable  variable to observable trade cost proxies. Such proxies
typically include geographic data such as distance between countries  and  as well as a range of
cultural, historical or political variables. This might also include some measures for standards and
technical regulations as we explain in the next section.
3 The ‘Direct’ Approach
The direct approach to measuring trade costs collects observable data or proxy variables on trade cost
components. The literature we review is grouped under two headings according to the way standards
and technical regulations are measured: explicit measures assess the existence or the amount of
standards and regulations, while implicit measures typically capture the trade e¤ects of standards
and regulations without establishing how many are present.
3.1 Explicit Measures
Count of the Number of Standards Perinorm is a subscription-only bibliographic database
on national, European and international standards for the industries of 23 countries. The papers
that use this rich database to measure standards typically count the total number of standards per
industry and country, and distinguish ‘national’ standards from ‘harmonized’ standards (de…ned as
being equivalent either to international standards, e.g., Swann et al., 1996, or to the ones of trading
3The ¦ and 

 variables are also known as multilateral resistance variables. They can be interpreted as average
trade barriers. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for a formal de…nition and a more detailed explanation.
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partners, e.g., Moenius, 2004, 2006, 2007).45 Unfortunately, such count measures su¤er from a ‘mixed
bag’ problem (Swann, 2010, p. 10) as they just add up standards that might di¤er in importance6
but also in type (e.g., quality versus compatibility standards). In an attempt to measure the relative
stringency and technical complexity of di¤erent standards, the number of pages of each standard is
sometimes used as a proxy for its complexity (Shepherd, 2006, Czubala et al., 2009).7
Noti…cation Data from the WTO The UNCTAD’s TRAINS database records noti…cations on
regulations to the WTO from the late 1980s and provides information on the notifying country (the
importer), the a¤ected product and the type of barrier. WTO rules require members to notify the
WTO whenever a proposed or adopted regulation 1) is not in accordance with an international one, and
2) may a¤ect the trade of other members. The use of such information to measure regulations therefore
su¤ers from three main shortcomings. First, if one country applies an internationally recognized
regulation while other countries do not, then this cross-country di¤erence is not accounted for in
the data set. Second, only changes to existing measures have to be reported, which means that
measures that have existed for a long time but have never been changed are not accounted for either.
Third, there is suspicion that some countries systematically notify more frequently than others, raising
concerns about data consistency across countries.
Noti…cations are generally used to compute coverage and frequency ratios to explain trade ‡ows
(e.g., Disdier et al., 2008, Essaji, 2008).8 Even if they are widely used in empirical analysis, it is
worth remembering that both su¤er from weaknesses: neither is able to capture precisely the relative
importance of each nontari¤ measure in a¤ecting trade ‡ows because the frequency ratio simply adds
up the measures as if they were all the same, while the coverage ratio erroneously gives a small weight
to the products covered by the most trade-restrictive policies (Nogués et al., 1986, Korinek et al.,
2006).
Identi…cation of Standards and Regulations Based on a literature review, case studies and
interviews with national bodies in the 15 EU member states and with EU o¢cials, a study undertaken
for the European Commission (European Commission, 1998) assesses the types of measures applying
in 130 industries within the EU: technical regulations, standards, both or no barriers. It also assesses,
on a …ve-point scale, the overall e¤ectiveness of EU policies in removing TBTs where the largest
value indicates that all TBTs were successfully removed (Chen, 2004, Chen and Novy, 2011). This
does not indicate how many standards or regulations are present nor how stringent they are, but this
4See also Temple and Urga (1997), Blind and Jungmittag (2005) or Portugal-Perez et al. (2010).
5The World Bank compiles two databases on EU standards using Perinorm: the European Standards Database
(EUSDB) for textiles, clothing and agricultural products between 1995 and 2003 (Shepherd, 2006) and the EU Elec-
tronical Standards Database (EUESDB) for electrotechnical products between 1990 and 2007 (Portugal-Perez et al.,
2010).
6 Indeed, standards are not ‘equally important economically: it is likely that using the same voltage in two countries
is more important for trade than using the same door handles’ (Moenius, 2004, p. 14).
7This proxy is far from perfect: the documents may di¤er in their information content and contain speci…cations
for more than one standard (Korinek et al., 2006). Also, Perinorm records the number of pages of each standard in its
original language which may di¤er between standards (Portugal-Perez et al., 2010).
8Frequency ratios provide the proportion of products that are subject to nontari¤ measures within a given product
classi…cation. Coverage ratios calculate the volume or value of trade/imports subject to nontari¤ measures as a percentage
of total trade/imports in a given product category.
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information can be used to distinguish industries according to the type of measures that exist and
whether they are still a¤ected by TBTs or not.
3.2 Implicit Measures
Regional Agreements This approach consists of counting or identifying (with a dummy variable)
the policy instruments that aim to harmonize standards or regulations within a region.9 The instru-
ments considered in the literature are usually EU-speci…c (Brenton et al., 2001, Henry de Frahan
and Vancauteren, 2006, Baller, 2007, Chen and Mattoo, 2008) while Mutual Recognition Agreements
(on conformity assessment procedures) involve both EU and non-EU countries (Baller, 2007, Chen
and Mattoo, 2008). The count or identi…cation of instruments is carried out either at the industry
level (Baller, 2007, Chen and Mattoo, 2008) or at the disaggregated level of products, in which case
coverage or frequency ratios are computed at the industry level (Brenton et al., 2001, Henry de Frahan
and Vancauteren, 2006).
Surveys The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey analyzes how the exports of 689 in-
dividual …rms in 17 developing countries to 5 developed countries in 2002 are a¤ected by foreign
technical requirements. Five speci…c questions allow the construction of variables capturing the trade
e¤ects of standards and technical regulations (binary variables) and of conformity assessment proce-
dures (including the average time in days it takes for conformity assessment inspection to complete).
See Maskus et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2006).10
Case Studies Other papers focus on the trade e¤ects of one speci…c regulation only. For instance,
Otsuki et al. (2001) use the maximum a‡atoxin levels, a toxic fungus, that are permitted in EU
groundnut imports.11 Wilson and Otsuki (2002) use the maximum residue limit (MRLs) of chlorpyri-
fos, a pesticide, in a¤ecting banana and plantain imports, while Wilson et al. (2003) use the MRLs of
tetracycline, a widely used antibiotic, to explain beef imports. All three papers also use the di¤erence
between the domestic regulation and the Codex equivalent to predict the changes in trade ‡ows if
regulations were harmonized at the Codex level.12 This allows researchers to determine the stringency
of a national regulation relative to Codex in a¤ecting trade, but not the stringency of the regulation
itself.
Other studies measure the di¤usion or adoption of one speci…c international standard across coun-
tries and typically investigate its e¤ect on trade. Although di¤usion does not capture the stringency
of a standard, it can be expected to promote trade by stimulating the competitiveness of domestic
9This is an implicit measure as there is no reason to expect the number of harmonization policies to be correlated
with the number of standards and regulations: two countries may share the same number of harmonization policies, but
one may have many standards and regulations while the other does not.
10Other surveys include the USITC (1998) on standards in the computer hardware, software and telecommunications
equipment sectors; OECD (1999) on the role of compliance costs in the telecommunications equipment, dairy products
and automotive components industries; or NIST (2004) for the pharmaceuticals and automobile industries in the US.
11Xiong and Beghin (2011) question the results by Otsuki et al. (2001) that African exports to the EU are negatively
a¤ected by the maximum a‡atoxin levels permitted.
12The Codex Alimentarius is a collection of internationally recognized standards, guidelines and codes of practice as
recommended by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization
(WHO) for the agri-food industry. It o¤ers a benchmark for food standards but there is no obligation for national
governments to adopt them.
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products by signaling their quality and safety. In the case of ISO 9000, a quality management standard
for …rms, Clougherty and Grajek (2009) use the ratio between the number of ISO 9000 certi…cates in
a country and its population, while Kim and Reinert (2009) rely on the proportion of …rms in each
country with ISO 9000 certi…cation. Herzfeld et al. (2011) count the number of issued certi…cates for
GlobalGAP and BRC Food Technical Standard in di¤erent countries.
To conclude, the reviewed literature suggests that measuring standards and technical regulations
is not an easy task. Explicit measures attempt to capture the presence or the amount of standards
and regulations by using dummy or count variables, frequency or coverage ratios, but their stringency
remains hard to evaluate. Implicit measures su¤er from similar problems. It should be added that
the possible endogeneity of standards and regulations – however measured – in explaining trade ‡ows
is another concern. Firstly, standards and regulations, as well as the decision to harmonize across
countries, could be the result rather than the cause of trade. Secondly, the trade weights that are
required for the computation of coverage ratios are usually the same trade ‡ows that appear as a
dependent variable, making coverage ratios endogenous by construction (Chen and Mattoo, 2008,
Essaji, 2008, or Clougherty and Grajek, 2009, use Instrumental Variables estimation while Czubala
et al., 2009, and Portugal-Perez et al., 2010, use the lagged values of standards).
4 The ‘Indirect’ Approach
We now turn to the ‘indirect’ approach of measuring trade costs. Indirect trade cost measures capture
a wide range of trade cost elements and are therefore hardly suitable to quantify the costs related
to standards and regulations only. However, they can be regressed on various trade cost proxies,
including measures of standards and regulations as discussed in the previous section, and a variance
decomposition can be carried out to determine the contribution of standards and regulations to the
variance of the comprehensive trade cost measure.
Returning to gravity equation (1), a problem with specifying the trade cost function is its inherent
arbitrariness. Although most researchers opt for a log-linear trade cost function, theory generally gives
no guidance as to the appropriate functional form.13 As a result, the estimated e¤ect of a certain
trade cost element depends on the chosen ad hoc form. A second problem is that many trade cost
elements are unobservable. Thus, researchers run the risk of omitting potentially important trade cost
elements. A third problem is that some proxies such as distance do not vary over time, which makes
it di¢cult to track changes in trade costs.
The indirect approach tries to overcome these problems by indirectly inferring implied trade costs
from trade data without specifying a trade cost function. A …rst step in that direction is taken
by the ‘phi-ness’ of trade. The idea is to isolate the trade cost variable from the micro-founded
gravity equation and express it in terms of observable trade data. But solving equation (1) for  is
problematic as the multilateral resistance variables are unknown. However, they can be eliminated by
multiplying the gravity equation by its counterpart for trade ‡ows in the opposite direction, , and
13See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, pp. 710 ¤.) for a discussion. Eaton and Kortum (2002) allow for a more
‡exible spline speci…cation that distinguishes between six di¤erent distance intervals. Trade cost functions that are linear
in levels can also be found in the literature.
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then dividing it by the product of gravity equations for domestic trade ‡ows in each country, 

 .
Taking the square root results in the expression for the phi-ness of trade :
 ´
Ã






! 1
2
=
Ã






! 1¡
2
 (2)
This approach was …rst adopted by Head and Ries (2001) and followed by a number of other papers
(e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003, Head and Mayer, 2004).14 Expression (2) should be interpreted as an overall
trade cost measure at the industry level that captures a comprehensive set of trade cost elements,
scaled by the industry-speci…c elasticity of substitution . It measures bilateral trade costs relative
to domestic trade costs and is by construction symmetric (i.e.,  = 

). Since it is a function of
observable trade data,  can generally be constructed for many countries, industries and years and
is thus in principle more broadly available than many direct trade cost data.15 For example, Head and
Mayer (2004) calculate  for 21 industries for the US-Canada and France-Germany country pairs in
1995.
A drawback of phi-ness is that it cannot distinguish between the trade cost variables and the
elasticity of substitution  because it is based on a simple trade ratio. When dealing with aggregate
data, this might not be a major concern.16 But when the focus is on measuring trade costs at the
industry level, it must be taken into account that substitution elasticities vary substantially across
industries (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Chen and Novy (2011) therefore adopt a related trade cost
measure that they denote  :
 =
Ã
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=
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2
 (3)
A high value of  corresponds to relatively high implied bilateral trade costs. Since a low 
indicates a high degree of di¤erentiation of products and thus a large degree of heterogeneity,  is
able to separate di¤erences in trade barriers from heterogeneity at the industry level.17
Chen and Novy (2011) estimate the substitution elasticities using a methodology adapted from
Feenstra (1994) and compute  for 163 industries across 11 EU countries between 1999 and 2003.
They regress  on a number of trade cost proxies and …nd that, among other factors, TBTs signif-
icantly increase implied trade costs. They also …nd that about 2.7 percent of the variance of  is
explained by their TBT measure (which captures the e¤ectiveness of EU policies in removing TBTs,
European Commission, 1998).
It should be noted that the two expressions in (2) and (3) are not estimated but rather calibrated
14Unlike in equation (2), phi -ness is sometimes also de…ned as ()
1¡ , typically in combination with the additional
assumptions of bilateral trade cost symmetry (i.e.,  = 

) and zero domestic trade costs (i.e., 

 = 

 = 1).
15However, domestic trade data,  and 

 , need to be constructed by deducting exports from total domestic pro-
duction. See Wei (1996) and Novy (2011) for a discussion.
16See Jacks et al. (2008) for an application to aggregate trade data in the long run.
17Another alternative to measuring overall trade costs would be to construct trade restrictiveness indices (Anderson
and Neary, 2005). The di¤erence to the approach underlying expressions (2) and (3) is that direct trade cost data are
required to construct trade restrictiveness indices (Kee et al., 2009).
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from the data, not unlike the Solow residual in the growth literature or the labor wedge (Shimer,
2009). A disadvantage is that the expressions therefore contain any measurement error that may be
part of the trade ‡ow data. Thus, as a matter of caution they should be interpreted as trade cost
measures, not literally as trade costs.
To conclude, the direct and the indirect approaches provide researchers with di¤erent sets of
information and thus can be considered as complementary: the …rst provides measures for standards
and regulations that can be used to estimate the sensitivity of trade ‡ows to standards and regulations;
the second regresses implied trade costs on standards and regulations, which further allows for a
decomposition of the variance of total trade costs into the contribution that is attributable to standards
and regulations. Both are equally a¤ected by the problems inherent to the measurement of standards
and regulations (use of count variables, frequency and coverage ratios) and by endogeneity. But in
contrast to the direct approach, the indirect approach requires domestic trade data which are not
always readily available, while at the same time it has an in-built control for multilateral resistance.
Finally, with regard to the indirect approach,  is theoretically better suited than 

 to isolate the
trade barrier e¤ect from the heterogeneity e¤ect, but in practice its computation can be di¢cult as it
requires estimates of the substitution elasticities .
5 Illustration
We now compare the direct and the indirect approaches to measuring standards. We use the data from
Chen and Novy (2011) to measure bilateral trade frictions as captured by  and 

 (the indirect
approach) between 11 EU countries at the 4-digit NACE industry level between 1999 and 2003, and
we also use the corresponding trade ‡ows 

 (as an illustration of the direct approach).
18 We
regress the three variables on the number of private standards at the EU level taken from the World
Bank’s EU Standards database (Shepherd, 2006) at the HS2002 level for the agriculture, textiles and
clothing industries which results in a sample of 35 NACE industries.19 To reduce endogeneity issues
standards are lagged by one period. Given that these standards are shared by EU countries, we would
expect them to correlate positively with trade ‡ows and negatively with  and 

.
Table 1 reports the results of regressing , 

 and 



 on standards 

¡1 in
addition to other typical gravity variables.20 Column (1) indicates that standards lower . In
contrast, they are insigni…cant in explaining  (column 2) or trade ‡ows (column 3). Table 2 shows
that standards explain 14 percent of the variance of  and nothing of the variance of 

 or bilateral
trade 

. This exercise illustrates that the di¤erent approaches, as well as the use of di¤erent
indirect trade cost measures (i.e.,  versus 

), can lead to contrasting predictions regarding
the economic importance of standards. Technically, such di¤erences arise because in contrast to
 and 



, the 

 measure has an in-built control for the elasticity of substitution . But
18See Chen and Novy (2011) for data sources.
19The HS2002 is more disaggregated than the NACE Rev.1 level classi…cation. We match each NACE industry with
the HS code that reports the largest number of standards.
20These variables are bilateral and domestic distances, dummies for sharing a common border, a common language,
for Finland and Austria that joined the EU last in the sample and for remaining outside the Eurozone. Chen and Novy
(2011) also consider other explanatory variables which we exclude here for simplicity. For  and 

, year and 3-digit
industry …xed e¤ects are included while for trade ‡ows controls for multilateral resistance are used.
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from an economic point of view, further research should investigate the reasons why controlling for
heterogeneity leads to such di¤erences and what the interaction between heterogeneity and standards
is.
6 Concluding Remarks
Standards and technical regulations are a predominant concern in today’s global trade negotiations,
and as claimed by Pascal Lamy, the WTO Director-General, they can even be considered as ‘the
real 21st century trade issues.’21 For the purpose of empirical analysis it is therefore crucial to better
measure standards and regulations, and we hope that additional and more precise measures will
become available in the future. For instance, the availability of a data set similar to Perinorm but for
mandatory technical regulations would be welcome. Also, although some uno¢cial concordance exists
between the International Classi…cation of Standards (as used by Perinorm) and the SITC trade
classi…cation (Blind, 2004), future research would further bene…t from a better matching between
standards and trade classi…cations.
As far as the indirect approach of inferring trade costs is concerned, future research needs to
examine the robustness of this approach to recent theoretical innovations. For example, Fieler (2011)
introduces nonhomotheticity such that rich countries produce and demand a di¤erent bundle of goods
than poor countries. Nonhomotheticity would be a problem for the trade cost measures (2) and (3) if
it applied di¤erentially to bilateral and domestic trade. Also, few frameworks exist for gravity with
di¤erent stages of intermediate production (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2011). In addition, Chen and Novy
(2011) show that the exponent of the trade cost measure (3) is not necessarily a function of the CES
substitution elasticity and could depend on technology parameters including the Fréchet parameter
of the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) or the Pareto parameter of heterogeneous …rms
models by Melitz (2003) or Chaney (2008). Finally, we show that the di¤erent approaches, as well
as the use of di¤erent indirect trade cost measures, can lead to contrasting predictions regarding the
economic importance of standards. Understanding the reasons for such di¤erences is an additional
avenue for future research.
21 ‘EU and Asean to pave way for trade pact talks’, The Financial Times, September 7, 2004.
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Table 1: ‘Direct’ vs. ‘Indirect’ Approaches to Measuring Standards
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ln  ln

 ln





Geography/Transport Costs
ln 0388
(7926)
 3765
(15219)
 ¡2931
(¡9285)

ln ( £) ¡0231
(¡1640)
¡2825
(¡3255)
 –
 ¡0033
(¡0770)
¡0300
(¡1386)
0465
(2078)

 ¡0255
(¡3052)
 ¡2031
(¡4160)
 2093
(4048)

Policy Variables
ln¡1 ¡0267
(¡7439)
 ¡0099
(¡0742)
¡0136
(¡0308)
 0136
(3500)
 1649
(8007)
 ¡8366
(¡25524)

 0037
(1308)
0407
(2518)
 ¡0426
(¡1963)

 2,364 2,364 2,364
Adj-2 0.578 0.649 0.962
Notes: Year and 3-digit industry …xed e¤ects are included in (1) and (2), industry times year …xed e¤ects,
separately for the exporting and the importing country, are included in (3). Robust standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the 4-digit NACE Rev.1 level in each country pair. The sample period is 1999-
2003. -statistics in parentheses. Constant terms are included but not reported. ,  and  indicate
signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Explanatory variables include bilateral distance 
and domestic distances  £ , dummies for sharing a common border  and a common language
 , lagged standards ¡1, and dummies for Finland and Austria who joined the EU last in the
sample  and for remaining outside the Eurozone . For a description of the variables,
see Chen and Novy (2011).
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Table 2: Variance Decompositions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ln  ln

 ln





Geography/Transport Costs 2.27% 22.85% 21.84%
ln 1.72% 19.06% 18.85%
ln ( £) 0.18% 1.31% –
 0.15% 1.16% 1.92%
 0.22% 1.32% 1.07%
Policy Variables 14.65% 6.17% 46.28%
ln¡1 14.19% 0.79% 0.37%
 0.46% 5.38% 45.91%
 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3-digit industry …xed e¤ects 40.89% 35.77% –
Year …xed e¤ects 0.01% 0.12% –
Multilateral resistance …xed e¤ects – – 28.08%
Variation explained 57.82% 64.91% 96.20%
Residual 42.18% 35.09% 3.80%
Sum 100% 100% 100%
 2,364 2,364 2,364
Notes: The variance decompositions are calculated according to Fields (2003). The contribution of each ex-
planatory variable  to the total variance of a dependent variable  is given by  =  (  )  ( )
where  is the partial regression coe¢cient of  on the explanatory variable  (holding all other ex-
planatory variables constant). The decompositions in columns (1) to (3) correspond to regressions (1) to
(3) in Table 1. The contributions sum to 100 percent.
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